Russian foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict : Prudent geopolitics, incapacity or identity?

This article fundamentally re-examines Russia’s foreign policy
towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, trying to explain the
sources of its behavior. In particular, it assesses its foreign policy
in the light of its strategic interests, material capabilities versus
incapacity and identity. A central question is why Russia does not
give enough support to a settlement based upon modus vivendi. It
argues that whereas Russia does not have the capacity to achieve
a final solution to the conflict, it has ample resources to obtain a
solution that would release the occupied regions outside
Nagorno-Karabakh and leave the status of the territory unresolved
for an indefinite future. The article sheds light on the factors
undergirding its policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
arguing for the utility of a different perspective on its
commitments. It adds new insights to the existing body of
literature on Russia’s policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
such as incapacity and identity with implications for a better
understanding of broader Russian foreign policy. Moreover, with
South Ossetia and Crimea in the spotlight, Russian foreign policy
towards the conflict has been viewed through geopolitics and
neo-imperialism, but remains little understood.